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Abstract: 
People evaluate themselves more favorably when they outperform a referent (downward 
comparison) than when they underperform a referent (upward comparison). However, research 
has yet to examine whether people are sensitive to the status of the referent during social 
comparison. That is, does defeating a highly skilled referent yield more favorable self-
evaluations than defeating an unskilled referent? Does losing to an unskilled referent yield less 
favorable self-evaluations than losing to a skilled referent? To address these questions, 
participants learned that they performed better or worse than another person (social comparison) 
who ranked above average or below average (referent status). Social comparison information had 
a more pronounced influence on self-evaluations than referent status information. Furthermore, 
consistent with self-enhancement theories, participants selectively highlighted referent status 
information when it had favorable implications for the self. These findings demonstrate that 
people neglect referent status information, leading winners to evaluate themselves favorably 
even when the competitor is incompetent. 
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Article: 
Scholars have long recognized that thoughts and feelings about the self are in part determined by 
how one stacks up in comparison to relevant peers (Festinger, 1954 and Wood, 1989). These 
social comparisons are a ubiquitous and perhaps automatic component of everyday experience. 
For example, social comparisons occur among classmates, coworkers, and teammates, as well as 
friends, family, and intimate partners. Among the most common types of social comparisons are 
those that pertain to ability judgments (Alicke, Zell, & Guenther, 2013). Although there are some 
exceptions, people typically desire superior abilities. That is, self-evaluations are elevated upon 
learning that one's performances rank superior to others (downward comparison), and self-
evaluations are deflated upon learning that one's performances rank inferior to others (upward 
comparison). 
Numerous studies have supported the basic proposition that upward comparisons typically yield 
less flattering self-perceptions of ability than downward comparisons (Markman and McMullen, 
2003 and Mussweiler, 2003). However, this focus on comparison direction (upward, downward) 
neglects a core component of the comparison process. Not only do people know whether they are 
better or worse than a competitor, but they may also have insight into the ability of the 
competitor more generally. In some contexts, people rank better or worse than a competitor that 
places at the top of the performance distribution (e.g., a star athlete). In other contexts, people 
rank better or worse than a competitor that places at the bottom of the performance distribution 
(e.g., a struggling athlete). We refer to knowledge specifying the general position of the 
competitor as referent status information. 
Surprisingly, despite enormous empirical attention granted to upward and downward social 
comparisons over the last several decades (Fiske, 2011, Guimond, 2006 and Suls and Wheeler, 
2000), researchers have largely ignored whether people are sensitive to referent status 
information. In a relevant study, college students who outperformed an adult on an intelligence 
test felt better about themselves than students who outperformed a 10-year old; similarly, 
students who underperformed a 10-year old felt worse about themselves than students who 
underperformed an adult (Webster, Powell, Duvall, & Smith, 2006). These findings provide 
initial support for the notion that people are sensitive to aspects of the referent during social 
comparison, such as age. Nonetheless, research to our knowledge has not systematically varied 
referent status information to examine whether it moderates social comparison effects.1 
Theoretical framework 
Logically, one would assume that people should be highly sensitive to the status of the referent. 
Outperforming a strong referent should yield more favorable self-perceptions than outperforming 
a weak referent. Similarly, underperforming a weak referent should yield less favorable self-
perceptions than underperforming a strong referent. However, we propose that people's reactions 
to referent status information may defy logical prescriptions. Specifically, we utilize prior 
research on the dominance of local comparisons ( Zell & Alicke, 2010) as well as self-
enhancement ( Alicke & Sedikides, 2009) to propose that people will largely neglect referent 
status information but selectively highlight it when it serves ego-enhancement needs. 
Along these lines, previous research on the local dominance effect indicates that self-evaluations 
of ability are more sensitive to one's rank in immediate local groups (i.e., local comparisons) 
than one's rank in larger, more representative groups (i.e., general comparisons). For example, 
learning that one ranks best or worst among a group of five competitors has a stronger influence 
on self-evaluations than learning that one ranks better than 84% or 32% of 1500 previous test 
takers, when people receive both feedback types (Zell & Alicke, 2009). In addition, learning that 
one ranks better or worse than a single competitor has a stronger influence on self-evaluations 
than learning that one ranks above average or below average, when people receive both feedback 
types (Buckingham & Alicke, 2002). The interpretation of these findings is that people are 
highly tuned to social comparisons with competitors in immediate local environments, but that 
people are less affected by pallid statistical information indicating one's rank in larger samples. 
Extrapolating from local dominance research, we argue that social comparison information 
indicating one's position in comparison to a referent may have a stronger influence on ability 
self-evaluations than broader, contextual information indicating the status of the referent. 
Importantly, however, referent status information is unique from general comparisons studied in 
prior research, in that it does not directly pertain to the self. Rather than informing people 
that their performance ranked above average or below average (e.g., Buckingham and Alicke, 
2002 and Zell and Alicke, 2009), referent status information specifies that a competitor's 
performance ranked above average or below average. Thus, referent status is distinct from other 
types of general comparison in that it does not directly reflect one's own performance. Further, 
another unique aspect of referent status information is that it serves to augment the meaning of 
local comparisons. Outperforming a high status competitor should yield altogether different 
reactions than outperforming a low status competitor. However, it remains to be seen whether 
people take into account the status of the referent when estimating their ability. 
Beyond the contribution of local and general comparison processes, reactions to referent status 
information may also be colored by desires to maintain a positive self-image. According to a 
robust literature on self-enhancement and self-protection (Alicke and Sedikides, 
2009 and Sedikides and Gregg, 2008), a variety of construal processes can be employed to 
salvage a positive self-image in the context of self-evaluative threat. Thus, one might anticipate 
that people will selectively highlight referent status information when it has favorable 
implications for the self. This selective attention to referent status might be especially 
pronounced following upward comparison than downward comparison, because people often 
seek flattering information about themselves following upward comparison as a coping 
mechanism (Taylor & Lobel, 1989). 
Indirect support for our position can be found in recent research demonstrating that people who 
win a prize are happy regardless of the prize amount (i.e., $3 vs. $7), but people who lose a prize 
are less bothered when the prize amount is low as opposed to high (Kassam, Morewedge, 
Gilbert, & Wilson, 2011). Negative experiences, such as losing a prize, presumably trigger more 
complex attributional processes, leading people to consider additional standards beyond the most 
salient ones. Although social comparisons with peers in the local environment are highly salient, 
statistical information specifying referent status is more abstract. By this logic, we propose that 
people should be more sensitive to referent status information following upward comparison than 
downward comparison. That is, winning a contest should yield relatively favorable self-
evaluations regardless of whether the competitor is competent or incompetent, yet losing a 
contest should yield more favorable self-evaluations when the competitor is competent as 
opposed to incompetent. 
Overview 
The current study examined whether referent status moderates the effect of social comparison 
information on self-evaluations. Participants completed a lie detection test and received 
manipulated feedback about their performance. Social comparison was manipulated by telling 
participants that their test performance ranked better (downward comparison) or worse (upward 
comparison) than the last participant to complete the study. Additionally, referent status was 
manipulated by telling participants that the last participant ranked above average or below 
average; participants in control conditions did not receive referent status information. We 
anticipated that social comparison information would have a more pronounced influence on self-
evaluations than referent status information. Furthermore, we anticipated that referent status 
information would have a greater influence on self-evaluations of participants in the upward 
comparison conditions than participants in the downward comparison conditions. 
Method 
Participants were 194 introductory psychology students (153 female, Mage = 19.01) at a 
university in the Southeastern United States who participated in groups of one to six students for 
course credit. The racial/ethnic composition of the sample was as follows: 60 African American, 
8 Asian, 104 Caucasian, 9 Hispanic, and 6 other race/ethnicity. Most participants were born in 
the USA (178) and most grew up in the USA (184). To provide adequate statistical power, data 
were collected until at least 30 participants were obtained in each of the 6 experimental groups. 
Data were not analyzed until the entire sample was obtained. No participant was excluded from 
the statistical analyses reported below. Experimental stimuli and questionnaires were presented 
to participants by computer using MediaLab ( Empirisoft, 2010). Participants completed study 
measures in private, isolated booths. 
Upon arrival, participants were told that the purpose of the study was to measure the lie detection 
ability of students at their university. In an effort to increase the perceived importance of the 
task, participants were told that people who perform well on lie detection tests are more 
successful in a variety of occupations including psychology, business, education, and law. The 
lie detection test that was administered consisted of 25 brief video clips where speakers indicated 
their opinion on current events and campus issues (e.g.,Do you think that your campus is 
safe?, Do you think that 18 year olds should be able to legally drink alcohol?). After viewing 
each video clip, participants estimated whether the speaker was telling the truth or lying. 
Previous research found that performance on lie detection tests is sufficiently ambiguous to 
promote the believability of both positive and negative performance feedback (e.g., Buckingham 
& Alicke, 2002). 2 
Performance feedback 
After completing the test, participants received feedback about their performance that was 
determined using random assignment. Social comparison was manipulated by telling participants 
that they performed better (downward comparison) or worse (upward comparison) than the last 
student to complete the study on the same computer as them. Specifically, all participants were 
told that the last student to complete the study on their computer correctly answered 17 out of 25 
questions on the test. Some participants were told that they correctly answered 20 out of 25 
questions, and therefore ranked better than the previous participant. Other participants were told 
that they correctly answered 14 out of 25 questions on the test, and therefore ranked worse than 
the previous participant. 
Referent status was manipulated by telling participants that the last student to complete the study 
on their computer ranked above average or below average in comparison to several hundred 
students at their university. Participants in control conditions did not receive referent status 
information. 3 A summary of the feedback conditions is provided in Table 1, and a sample of the 
feedback protocol is provided in Table 2. Among participants who received both sets of 
feedback, social comparison information was always provided before referent status information. 
This order was selected so that social comparison processes would be activated before the 
potential moderating influence of referent status was introduced. 
Table 1. Feedback conditions and sample sizes. 
Condition Own score Referent score Referent status n 
1 20 17 Above average 33 
2 20 17 Below average 32 
3 20 17 None provided 32 
4 14 17 Above average 33 
5 14 17 Below average 32 
6 14 17 None provided 32 
Note. Test scores were out of 25 total questions. 
Table 2. Sample feedback protocol. 
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LIE DETECTION TEST RESULTS: 
You correctly answered 20 out of 25 questions on the test. 
The last student on this computer correctly answered 17 out of 25 questions. This 
student ranked ABOVE AVERAGE. 
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LIE DETECTION TEST RESULTS: 
A graphical depiction of your score and the previous participant's score is provided 
below. 
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Dependent measures 
Next, participants completed a brief questionnaire that assessed their reactions to the feedback. 
Participants first evaluated their lie detection performance (How well did you perform on the lie 
detection test?) and ability (How would you rate your lie detection ability?) on 1 (very 
poorly/bad) to 9 (very well/good) scales. These judgments were aggregated to create one index 
of self-evaluations (r = .79). Participants also evaluated the performance (How well did the last 
student on this computer perform on the lie detection test?) and ability (How would you rate the 
last student's lie detection ability?) of the referent. These judgments were aggregated to create 
one index of referent-evaluations (r = .89). 
Participants then completed manipulation checks where they were asked to recall the number of 
questions they and the last student correctly answered on the test out of 25. All of the participants 
correctly recalled the scores that they received. Lastly, participants were debriefed for suspicion 
about the provided feedback. No participant expressed undue suspicion about the validity of the 
test scores. 
Results 
Self-evaluations 
A 2 (social comparison: upward, downward) × 3 (referent status: above average, below average, 
none) ANOVA was conducted on self-evaluations. This analysis yielded a significant main 
effect of social comparison, F(1, 188) = 434.08, p < .001, ηp2 = .70. Participants in the 
downward comparison conditions (M = 6.88, SD = 0.93) evaluated themselves significantly more 
favorably than participants in the upward comparison conditions (M = 3.86, SD = 1.29). 
The main effect of referent status was also significant, F(2, 188) = 18.04, p < .001, ηp2 = .16. 
We conducted planned contrasts to further explore the main effect of referent status. Participants 
told that the referent ranked below average (M = 4.77, SD = 2.21) evaluated themselves 
significantly less favorably than participants in the above average (M = 5.79, SD = 1.69) and no 
average referent conditions (M = 5.54,SD = 1.56), t(191) = 3.16, p = .001, d = 0.52 
and t(191) = 2.38, p = .02, d = 0.40, respectively. There was no significant difference in self-
evaluations when comparing participants in the above average and no average referent 
conditions, t(191) = 0.77, p = .44, d = 0.15. 
Finally, the social comparison by referent status interaction was significant, F(2, 
188) = 7.48, p = .001, ηp2 = .07 (see Fig. 1). Planned contrasts were conducted to decompose 
the interaction. First, we tested our prediction that social comparison information would have a 
more potent influence on self-evaluations than referent status information. Consistent with this 
prediction, participants evaluated themselves significantly more favorably when they ranked 
better than a below average referent than when they ranked worse than an above average 
referent, t(188) = 8.67, p < .001, d = 2.20. 
 
Fig. 1. Target-evaluations as a function of social comparison (downward, upward) and referent 
status (above average, no average, below average). Error bars are ± 1 SEM. 
Additional contrasts examined whether participants were differentially sensitive to referent status 
information as a function of social comparison. Participants in the downward comparison 
conditions were largely insensitive to referent status information. Specifically, downward 
comparison participants told that the referent ranked above average did not evaluate themselves 
significantly more favorably than downward comparison participants in the below average and 
no average referent conditions, t(188) = 1.80,p = .07, d = 0.45 
and t(188) = 1.17, p = .24, d = 0.31, respectively. Further, downward comparison participants 
told that the referent ranked below average did not evaluate themselves significantly less 
favorably than downward comparison participants in the no average referent 
condition, t(188) = 0.62,p = .54, d = 0.20. Thus, downward comparison participants evaluated 
themselves relatively favorably, regardless of the position of the referent in the performance 
distribution (i.e., above average, below average, none). 
However, participants in the upward comparison conditions were sensitive to referent status 
information. Specifically, upward comparison participants evaluated themselves significantly 
more favorably when the referent ranked above average than below 
average, t(188) = 6.37, p < .001, d = 1.41. Similarly, upward comparison participants evaluated 
themselves significantly more favorably when they received no referent status information than 
when they were told that the referent ranked below average, t(188) = 5.51, p < .001,d = 1.21. 
There was no significant difference between upward comparison participants in the no average 
and above average referent conditions, t(188) = 0.82, p = .42, d = 0.20. 
Referent-evaluations 
A 2 (social comparison: upward, downward) × 3 (referent status: above average, below average, 
none) ANOVA was conducted on referent-evaluations. This analysis yielded a significant main 
effect of referent status, F(2, 188) = 67.96, p < .001, ηp2 = .42 (see Fig. 1). A planned 
comparison showed that referent-evaluations were significantly more favorable when the referent 
ranked above average (M = 6.20,SD = 1.11) than below average 
(M = 4.25, SD = 1.08), t(191) = 10.85, p < .001, d = 1.78. Further, participants who did not 
receive referent status information (M = 5.70, SD = 0.87) evaluated the referent significantly 
more favorably than participants told that the referent ranked below 
average, t(191) = 8.00,p < .001, d = 1.48, and significantly less favorably than participants told 
that the referent ranked above average, t(191) = 2.78, p = .006, d = 0.50. 
The main effect of social comparison was also significant, F(1, 188) = 13.76, p < .001, η
p
2 = .07. Participants in the upward comparison conditions (M = 5.66, SD = 1.44) evaluated the 
referent significantly more favorably than participants in the downward comparison conditions 
(M = 5.13, SD = 1.13). Finally, the social comparison by referent status two-way interaction was 
not statistically significant, F(2, 188) = 1.74,p = .18, ηp2 = .02. 
Self-evaluations versus referent-evaluations 
A 2 (social comparison: upward, downward) × 3 (referent status: above average, below average, 
none) × 2 (target: self-evaluations, referent-evaluations) ANOVA was conducted with repeated 
measures on the third factor. Of importance, this model yielded a significant social comparison 
by referent status by target three-way interaction, F(2, 188) = 3.34, p = .04, ηp2 = .03. In the 
upward comparison conditions, referent status information had a significant effect on referent-
evaluations, F(2, 94) = 37.43, p < .001, ηp2 = .44, as well as self-evaluations, F(2, 
94) = 20.42, p < .001, ηp2 = .30. Upward comparison participants evaluated the referent and 
themselves significantly more favorably when the referent ranked above average than below 
average. In the downward comparison conditions, however, referent status information had a 
significant effect on referent-evaluations, F(2, 94) = 30.95, p < .001, ηp2 = .40, but did not have 
a significant effect on self-evaluations, F(2, 94) = 2.00, p = .14, ηp2 = .04. Downward 
comparison participants evaluated the referent but not themselves significantly more favorably 
when the referent ranked above average than below average. 
In sum, whereas self-evaluations were only influenced by referent status information in the 
upward comparison conditions, referent-evaluations were influenced by referent status 
information in both the upward and downward comparison conditions. This finding rules out the 
possibility that participants in the downward comparison conditions did not sufficiently process 
referent status information; downward comparison participants neglected referent status during 
self-evaluations, but utilized referent status during referent-evaluations. 
Discussion 
Although numerous studies have examined reactions to upward and downward comparisons 
(Fiske, 2011,Guimond, 2006 and Suls and Wheeler, 2000), no previous research to our 
knowledge has directly tested whether referent status information moderates social comparison 
effects. The current study fills this critical gap in the social comparison literature. Formal logic 
would predict that people should be sensitive to referent status. That is, people should evaluate 
themselves more favorably when they outperform a high status than low status referent. 
Similarly, people should evaluate themselves less favorably when they underperform a low 
status than a high status referent. However, results of the current experiment suggest that 
reactions to referent status information may not follow these normative prescriptions. 
Specifically, although referent-evaluations were strongly influenced by referent status 
information, self-evaluations were influenced more strongly by social comparison information. 
These findings are consistent with, and contribute to, prior theories specifying that the effect of 
“local” social comparisons are often stronger than other types of self-relevant information (Zell 
& Alicke, 2010). Importantly, the current study suggests that local comparisons continue to have 
a disproportionate influence on self-evaluations even when the meaning of these comparisons is 
augmented substantially by referent status information. That is, outperforming a competitor in 
the local environment yields relatively favorable self-evaluations even when the competitor has 
low rank, and underperforming a competitor in the local environment yields relatively 
unfavorable self-evaluations even when the competitor has high rank. Thus, people may be more 
sensitive to the outcome of social comparisons (upward, downward) than their broader meaning. 
Our findings also suggest that ego-defense motives (Alicke & Sedikides, 2009) lead people to 
selectively highlight referent status information when it allows them to salvage a favorable self-
image. Whereas participants neglected referent status in the downward comparison conditions, 
referent status had a pronounced effect in the upward comparison conditions. These findings 
illuminate one of a growing number of strategies by which people maintain relatively favorable 
self-evaluations in the context of self-evaluative threat (Sedikides & Gregg, 2008). Because 
social comparisons are among the most primary determinants of self-evaluations (Alicke et al., 
2013 and Mussweiler, 2003), it is likely that the selective use of referent status information is a 
common self-protection strategy. 
More broadly, our findings have wide implications for self-perception theories. For example, 
several studies demonstrate that people overestimate their abilities, especially those who rank at 
the bottom of the performance distribution (Dunning, 2011 and Kruger and Dunning, 1999). 
People may develop inflated self-views because they focus on downward comparisons with 
inferior others, even when those comparison others have very low rank. Indeed, no matter how 
low people rank themselves, they can almost always find someone who is doing worse (Taylor & 
Lobel, 1989). In addition, our findings help explain research showing that students evaluate 
themselves more favorably when they have a high rank at an inferior school than when they have 
a low rank at a superior school, despite objectively equivalent performance (i.e., the big-fish–
little-pond effect; Liem et al., 2013 and Marsh, 1987). Whereas the first group engages in 
frequent downward comparisons, the second group engages in frequent upward comparisons. 
Our results suggest that student self-perceptions and career aspirations may be strongly 
influenced by these social comparisons, despite the fact that comparison referents at high rank 
and low rank schools are not representative of the student population as a whole. 
Finally, our results help explain apparently puzzling findings in the social comparison literature: 
people are less satisfied with themselves after comparing their accomplishments to superstars 
(Lockwood & Kunda, 1997), their attractiveness to super-models (Grabe, Ward, & Hyde, 2008), 
and their athleticism to professional athletes (Mussweiler, Ruter, & Epstude, 2004). One might 
expect that people would disregard comparisons to such extreme referents. However, the present 
findings suggest that people fail to adequately appreciate the status of the referent during social 
comparison. Future research is needed to more directly test whether comparisons to extreme 
referents, such as a competitor who ranks at the 99th percentile, yield greater sensitivity to 
referent status information than comparisons to moderate referents. 
Limitations and future directions 
A limitation of the present study was that it did not explicitly confirm that participants compared 
themselves to the referent, but this possibility remains likely for two reasons. First, all 
participants correctly recalled both their own score and the referent's score. Thus, all participants 
knew whether their score was higher or lower than the referent's score. Second, upward 
comparison participants evaluated themselves significantly more favorably when the referent 
ranked above average than below average, demonstrating that participants in these conditions 
used information about the referent to draw conclusions about themselves. Nonetheless, future 
study should explicitly ask participants whether or not they compared themselves to the referent 
to ensure that comparison processes occurred. 
Another potential limitation was that social comparison information was always provided before 
referent status information among participants who received both feedback types. Future study is 
needed to test whether feedback order influences the effect of referent status information. Future 
research is also needed to examine whether the effect of referent status information depends 
upon the perceived importance of the performance task. It's possible that participants may be 
more sensitive to referent status when tasks are perceived as highly important or self-relevant. 
Lastly, although the present study suggests that people neglect referent status information, it 
should be noted that people are sensitive to other aspects of the referent, such as age. Along these 
lines, college students feel better about themselves after outperforming an adult than a 10-year 
old child (Webster et al., 2006). Future study is needed to further explore whether and when 
aspects of the referent moderate social comparison effects. 
Conclusions 
In most competitions, there is a winner and a loser; however, winning and losing can mean 
different things depending on the status of the competitor. The present study suggests that people 
pay selective attention to referent status when it has favorable implications for the self. That is, 
losers evaluated themselves more favorably when the competitor was competent as opposed to 
incompetent, but winners evaluated themselves favorably even when the competitor was 
incompetent. Future studies should continue to explore the influence of referent status on self-
evaluation, motivation, and behavior in competitive settings. 
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